Key Management in Wireless Sensor Networks Using a Modified Blom Scheme by Reddy, Rohith Singi
1 
 
KEY MANGAMENT IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
USING A MODIFIED BLOM SCHEME 
Rohith Singi Reddy 
Computer Science Department 
Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078 
 
ABSTRACT 
Key establishment between any pair of nodes is an essential requirement for providing secure 
services in wireless sensor networks. Blom’s scheme is a prominent key management scheme 
but its shortcomings include large computation overhead and memory cost. We propose a 
new scheme in this paper that modifies Blom’s scheme in a manner that reduces memory and 
computation costs. This paper also provides the value for secure parameter t such that the 
network is resilient. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Sensor networks comprise a number of sensors with limited resources that are used to collect 
environmental information and they have been considered for various purposes including 
security monitoring, target tracking and research activities in hazardous environments. Recent 
advances in both electronic and computer technologies have increased the demand of wireless 
sensor networks. Since authentication and confidentiality protocols require an agreed key 
between the nodes and security of the communication depends on the cryptographic schemes 
employed, key management is a very important security issue in wireless sensor networks. 
Earlier key management protocols were based on either symmetric or asymmetric 
cryptographic functions. Due to resource limitations and lack of security in the sensors, key 
management protocols based on public keys are inefficient. Hence, symmetric algorithm 
based key management protocols are used in wireless sensor networks [6]. 
 
Several people have proposed different approaches to address the problem of key 
management [8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13]. The simple and easy method that could be 
employed is an online key management center [7]. But, this approach carries a high overhead. 
Another interesting method is to pre-distribute keys among the sensors, which can result in 
low cost key establishment in wireless sensor networks. But such schemes fail in handling 
security or efficiency problems. Some key management protocols use deployment knowledge 
to increase efficiency. In particular, key agreement schemes for wireless sensor networks 
must satisfy low energy consumption, low cost, low memory usage, lack of trusted 
infrastructure, resilient against node capture. 
 
Eschenauer and Gligor [1] proposed probabilistic key pre-distribution to establish pair-wise 
keys between neighboring nodes. In their scheme, each node is preloaded with a key subset 
from a global key pool in such a way that any two neighboring nodes can share at least one 
common key with a certain probability. This scheme is vulnerable to the node compromise 
attack, where keys of normal nodes can be known when some nodes are compromised by 
adversaries. Chan, Perrig, and Song [2] proposed the q-composite random key pre-
distribution scheme, in which they modified E-G scheme by only increasing the number of 
keys that two random nodes share from at least 1 to at least q. Their scheme achieves good 
security under small scale attacks while increased vulnerability in large scale node 
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compromise attack. Later, Du et al [3] proposed the multiple-space key pre-distribution 
scheme where each key is replaced by a special key space and many more people came with 
certain modifications to the existing scheme. All these schemes assume a random node 
deployment model where each sensor node has direct pair-wise keys shared with only portion 
of the neighbors, and depends on the multi hop or the path which is established in order for 
the nodes to communicate with long distance nodes. 
 
A different method of key management in sensor networks is given in [17]. This method 
requires marking the sensors in a ordered manner. Data in distributed networks can also be 
protected by using the method of partitioning [14]-[16], but that will not be considered here. 
 
In this paper, we propose a new key management scheme that is based on the pre-distribution 
scheme of Blom [3]. This paper provides a modification to the original Blom’s scheme and 
presents a solution to reduce computation overhead and memory cost. The modification is 
based on the use of the Hadamard matrix instead of the Vandermonde matrix of the Blom 
scheme. 
 
The Blom Scheme 
Blom’s key distribution method [4] allows any pair of users in the system to find a unique 
shared key. According to this method, a network with N users and a collusion of less than t+1 
users cannot reveal the keys which are held by other users. Thus the security of the network 
depends on the chosen value of t, which is called Blom’s secure parameter (t<<N). Larger 
value of t leads to greater resilience but one needs to be careful in choosing a high value 
because that increases the amount of memory required to store key information. 
 
During the initialization phase, a central authority or base station first constructs a (t + 1)×N 
matrix P over a finite field GF(q), where N is the size of the network and q is the prime 
number. P is known to all users and it can be constructed using Vandermonde matrix. It can 
be shown that any t+1 columns of P are linearly independent when ni, i=1, 2,…N are all 
distinct. 
 
 
Then the central authority selects a random (t + 1) × (t + 1) symmetric matrix S over GF(q), 
where S is secret and only known by the central authority. An N ×(t + 1) matrix A = (S. P)T is 
computed. Because S is symmetric, it is easy to see 
 
K =A.P= (S. P)T. P = PT. ST.P 
 =PT.S.P = (A.P)T = KT  
 
User pair (i, j) will use Kij, the element in row i and column j in K, as the shared key. Because 
Kij is calculated by the i-th row of A and the j-th column of P, the central authority assigns 
the i-th row of A matrix and the i-th column of P matrix to each user i, for 1, 2….. N. 
Therefore, when user i and user j need to establish a shared key between them, they first 
exchange their columns of P, and then they can compute Kij and Kji, respectively, using their 
private rows of A. The t-secure parameter guarantees that no compromise of up to t nodes has 
any information about Kij or Kji. 
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PROPOSED SCHEME 
 
Modified Blom Scheme 
The proposed method makes use of the original Blom’s scheme [4]. In the original Blom’s 
scheme all the computations involved in generating the keys are based on Vandermonde 
matrix which is a public matrix (P) and known to even the adversaries. Here, to make sure 
that any t+1 columns of P are linearly independent i.e., to generate unique keys, all the values 
in the matrix are chosen to be distinct. However, for large values of t, number of rows in the 
matrix increases and which in turn corresponds to a greater value in the columns because the 
column values increases in a geometric series. In the Blom’s scheme [4] for any two nodes to 
generate a common key, each node should store column of public matrix and row of the 
calculated secret matrix. Since every sensor node is provided with limited memory and 
energy, it will be difficult to store both the row and column in the sensor memory for a large 
network. 
 
To reduce the computation and memory overhead in Blom’s scheme, instead of using 
Vandermonde matrix [5] we propose the use of non-binary Hadamard matrix as the public 
matrix. As, the Hadamard matrix is a square matrix with 1s and -1s, it reduces of complexity 
of calculating values for all the elements corresponding to the columns in Vandermonde 
matrix. Another advantage of using Hadamard matrix is it reduces the cost of saving the 
columns in the memory of sensor because any node can easily generate Hadamard matrix of 
known size. Similar to Blom’s scheme the operation which are to be performed to generate 
the keys will depend on the prime number i.e., the number which depends on the desired key 
length.  
൦
1 1 1 1
1 െ1 1 െ1
1 1 െ1 െ1
1 െ1 െ1 1
 ൪ 
Figure 1. Binary Hadamard Matrix 
 
൦
1 1 1 1
1 30 1 30
1 1 30 30
1 30 30 1
 ൪ 
Figure 2. Non-Binary Hadamard Matrix for Modulo 31 
 
The original binary form Haramard matrix is depicted in Figure 1. The only change that is 
made to the Hadamard matrix is all negative numbers are replaced with the non-negative 
prime number. We can observe that the Hadamard matrix shown in Figure 2 contains equal 
numbers of one’s and the prime number, so all the further calculations will be very simple. 
Key generation technique is similar to that used in the Blom’s scheme [4]. Following are the 
steps involved in calculating the key. 
 
(1) Initially N × N form of the Hadamard matrix is considered and depending on the t 
value first t rows along with N columns are selected as the public matrix. The 
construction of Hadamard matrix depends on the prime number (q), we must set q to 
be larger than the network size (q>N).  
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(2) The central authority selects a random (t + 1) × (t + 1) symmetric matrix S, where S is 
secret and only known by the central authority. An N × (t + 1) matrix A = (S. P)T is 
computed. 
 
(3) The central authority stores each row of the matrix A in the node memory with 
corresponding index. This is shown in Figure 3. 
(4) Finally user pair (i, j) can compute the key by generating the Hadamard matrix and 
multiplying the secret row stored in the node with column of the Hadamard matrix 
corresponding to the node index with which it want to communicate. The key generation 
between any two nodes is shown in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 3. Storing rows into node memory 
 
 
Figure 4. Key Establishment between any pair of nodes 
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By integrating the proposed scheme along with the schemes which previously relied on 
Blom’s scheme such as Du. et al. [3] we can gain significant memory utilization along with 
reduced computations. 
 
Example 
The following example shows the working of the modified Blom’s scheme using Hadamard 
matrix. Let the number of nodes in the network be 8, secure parameter t=6 and prime number 
q=31 which says if no more than 6 nodes in the network are compromised it is not possible to 
find the keys of other users. The assumption is that all the sensor nodes are within the 
transmission range other and can communicate directly.  
 
Modified Hadamard Matrix 
 
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30
1 1 30 30 1 1 30 30
1 30 30 1 1 30 30 1
1 1 1 1 30 30 30 30
1 30 1 30 30 1 30 1
1 1 30 30 30 30 1 1
1 30 30 1 30 1 1 30
 
ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
  
 
Public Matrix (P) 
P= 
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 30 1 30 1 30 1 30
1 1 30 30 1 1 30 30
1 30 30 1 1 30 30 1
1 1 1 1 30 30 30 30
1 30 1 30 30 1 30 1
 
ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
 
 
Let secret matrix (S) is any symmetric matrix. 
 
S= 
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
3 11 15 28 7 5
11 30 4 1 2 8
15 4 6 14 18 21
28 1 14 17 25 6
7 2 18 25 27 9
5 8 21 6 9 8
 
ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
 
 
A= (S.P)T 
 
S.P= 
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
69 1345 1316 968 417 1403 1664 1026
56 1187 201 1274 346 1013 491 1100
78 1209 658 977 1209 1122 1789 890
91 787 990 700 990 1338 1889 1251
88 1132 1335 929 1132 1654 2379 1451
57 695 840 1130 550 724 1333 1159
 
ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
 mod 31 
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A= (S.P)T =
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
7 25 16 29 26 26
12 9 0 12 16 13
14 15 7 29 2 3
7 3 16 18 30 14
14 5 0 29 16 23
8 21 6 5 11 11
21 26 22 29 23 0
3 15 22 11 25 12
 
ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
 
 
After calculating matrix A each sensor node memory is filled with unique row chosen from 
matrix A corresponding to the same index. It shows that all the computations involved in 
calculating the matrix A are simple. 
 
Generating Key 
Any pair of nodes must generate a key for securely communicating with each other. Since, 
the Hadamard matrix is easy to construct, the overhead of storing a column in node memory 
is reduced. Suppose node two and node eight want to communicate with each other, first they 
generate the column of neighboring node using the Hadamard matrix and then multiply it 
with the row stored in the node memory. 
 
K2,8=A2.P8 =ሾ12 9 0 12 16 13ሿ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
1
30
30
1
30
1 ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
=787 mod 31=12 
K8,2=A8.P2=ሾ3 15 22 11 25 12ሿ
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
1
30
1
30
1
30ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
=1190 mod 31=12 
 
We can observe that both nodes generate a common key and further communication between 
them will make use of the pair-wise key. 
 
In general matrix K can be represented as shown below and we can notice that the symmetric 
nature gives the same key for any pair of nodes such that Kij = Kji. 
 
K= A.P 
 
K= 
ۏ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ێ
ۍ
5 0 8 26 25 0 28 26
0 25 7 18 4 19 11 12
8 7 29 20 29 9 19 22
26 18 20 22 0 17 25 21
25 4 29 0 9 18 13 14
0 19 9 17 18 19 27 17
28 11 19 25 13 27 4 10
26 12 22 21 14 17 10 26
 
ے
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ۑ
ې
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SIMULATION 
 
The Blom’s scheme provides a rough estimation for the value of secure parameter t and it 
doesn’t give any desired range for the parameter such that the entire network is secure within 
the range. The proposed scheme gives the value for secure parameter t so that all the nodes in 
the network can communicate with other in a secure manner. 
 
Secure Parameter (t) 
Simulations are carried on with a network size of 16, 32 and 64 with varying key length. 
Each network is tested with different value of the parameter t. It is observed that for any 
network we can generate large number of unique keys if the parameter size chosen is greater 
than half the size of the network. In general for a network with size N, the value of t should 
be t>=N/2+1 
 
It is observed that the prime number chosen to compute the keys has a great impact on 
number of unique keys generated in the network. For minimum prime number it shows to 
have maximum number of unique keys at N/2+1 but total number of unique keys increases if 
the value of prime number is increased. 
 
 
Figure 4 Number of unique keys for a network of 32 nodes 
 
Figure 4 shows value of t versus number of unique keys for a network with 32 nodes and for 
prime number 751. It is observed that for a t value greater the half the size of network (t=17) 
total number of unique keys generated by the network has increased drastically. Moreover, 
there is not much difference is observed if the t value is increased further. Figure 5 shows 
value of t versus number of unique keys for a network with 64 nodes and for prime number 
1181. Similar observation is made and found that total number of unique keys increases 
drastically at t=33. Perhaps, the total number of unique keys varies for different network sizes 
and different prime numbers. 
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It is observed that for any network containing N nodes if the value of t is chosen as t=N/2 +1 
then as long as t+1 nodes are compromised the remaining uncompromised nodes will 
communicate in a secure manner i.e., the network is resilient at t=N/2+1.  
 
 
Figure 5 Number of unique keys for a network of 64 nodes 
 
CONCLUSION 
This paper presents an alternative way of generating the keys using the Blom’s scheme. The 
proposed method has the advantage of reducing the computation overhead and memory costs 
over the original Blom’s scheme. In addition, this scheme provides the minimum value for 
the secure parameter t such that the network is more resilient. It may be noted that other 
decomposition schemes such as LU, LQ, QR, may be used to generate a key between any 
pair of nodes. 
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